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THE CONSTITUTION AS POSITIVE LAW:
BIVENS v. SIX UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS'
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
2
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution
• . . of the United States.
3
Employing only the foregoing pronouncements, the Supreme Court
of the United States in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics4 fashioned a private civil cause of action
for damages3 against federal officials who violate the commands of the
Fourth Amendment. In so doing, the Court proclaimed a body of
doctrine that could easily revolutionize the role of the Constitution in
the American legal system.
On July 7, 1967, Webster Bivens, acting pro se, brought a civil suit
for damages against six unknown agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York.6 His complaint alleged that the six agents, acting under color
of federal law, had entered his apartment on the morning of November
26, 1965, and had arrested him for alleged narcotic violations. 7 He
further claimed that the agents had manacled him in front of his fain-
1. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1875,'ch.
137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470).
4. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The title of the case derives from the fact that the plain-
tiff did not know the agents' names until they were supplied by the United States
Attorney after the filing of the complaint. Five agents were ultimately served. Id.
at 390 n.2.
5. The Supreme Court did not discuss the types or extent of damages recoverable.
It would appear, however, that a fairly liberal damage scheme will be necessary to
prevent their decision from being an empty gesture. See note 169 infra and text
accompanying notes 165-72, 256-60 infra.
6. 403 U.S. at 389, 398.
7. Id. at 389.
NOTES
ily, had threatened to arrest the entire family, and had searched the
apartment from stem to stem. The arrest and search were said to
have been accomplished without a warrant and without probable cause,
and the arrest was alleged to have been effected with unreasonable
force.9 Bivens was taken to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where
he was interrogated, booked and subjected to a visual strip search.10
Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment and
mental suffering as a result of the agents' unlawful conduct, and sought
damages in the amount of $15,000 from each defendant."
Bivens, by filing his complaint, had entered upon a difficult task.
Since no federal statute existed which could provide him with a rem-
edy,' 2 his only hope of recovery in the federal courts was in an action
founded directly upon the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment.
The Constitution, however, has assumed a rather unpretentious posi-
tion in the traditional scheme of American law. While admittedly the
"supreme Law of the Land,' 3 only rarely has it been utilized as a
source of offensively-oriented private rights of action. 4 The Consti-
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The charges against Bivens were dismissed by a United States Commis-
sioner. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
11. 403 U.S. at 389-90. Since Bivens did not allege any specific intent on the
part of the agents to deprive him of a constitutional right, the Court's ultimate recog-
nition that he stated a valid cause of action impliedly indicates that intent is not an
essential element of a civil cause of action under the Fourth Amendment. This would
be consonant with the approach taken by the courts regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where-
under a similar cause of action against state officers can be maintained without any
allegation of intent or motive. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556 (1967); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232-33 (4th Cir.
1970); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 786-89 (5th Cir. 1969).
12. The Civil Rights statutes are concerned primarily with action under color of
state law. See 403 U.S. at 398 n.1. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 specifically excludes govern-
mental liability for false arrest, abuse of process, and the performance of discretionary
functions by government employees. The court of appeals recognized that these
categories might well encompass Bivens' claim. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 725 (2d Cir. 1969). But see 3 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.08, at 469-70 (1958). The court of appeals
did note the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 2236, which provides criminal penalties for certain
searches made without a warrant. 409 F.2d at 724-25. The criminal sanction, how-
ever, does not afford any relief to the person injured. Furthermore, it is unrealistic
to expect it to be enforced. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of In-
dividual Rights, 39 MiNN. L. Ruv. 493, 493-94 (1955).
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. See, e.g., Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900), and Swafford v. Templeton,
185 U.S. 487 (1902) (cause of action for damages for deprivation of constitutional
1972]
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tution's character as a political document has obscured its function as
positive, pre-eminent law.'5
Bivens' fundamental constitutional claim was confronted from the
outset with a sextet of formidable barriers. First, could his claim for
damages, based solely -upon the Fourth Amendment (which fails to
provide expressly for its enforcement), be said to "arise under" the
Constitution" so as to vest jurisdiction in the district court? Second,
does the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits only governmental ac-
tion, 7 apply to an individual federal official who has exceeded his law-
ful authority by engaging in conduct forbidden by the amendment?
Third, is the Fourth Amendment the source of an independent federal
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, or is it merely
a limitation on the defenses a federal official can set up against a
claim brought under state tort law? Fourth, assuming jurisdiction
and the existence of a federal right, do the federal courts have the power
to afford a damage remedy for the violation of that right, or must they
await explicit congressional authorization? Fifth, what criteria should
be used in deciding whether or not to exercise that remedial power, if it
is found to exist? And sixth, to what extent does the doctrine of of-
ficial immunity apply?' 8
The district court found Bivens' claim to be entirely without merit.'0
right to vote sustained in both cases). The court of appeals in Bivens attempted to
distinguish these cases on the ground that they could have been brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. 409 F.2d at 724. It seems apparent, however, that the
Wiley and Swalford decisions were based upon the Constitution and not upon any
statute (other than the statute conferring general federal question jurisdiction). Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLuM. L. REV. 1109, 1125-26 n.74 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Hill]. The only portion of the Constitution which has been consistently
utilized as the source of offensively-oriented private rights of action is the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against the taking of land by the federal government without
paying just compensation therefor. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13
(1933) (value of land, plus interest, recoverable) and United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196 (1882) (recovery of possession allowed).
15. See generally Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality
and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Katz]; Hill, supra note 14.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
17. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944).
18. The doctrine of official immunity should be distinguished from that of sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity precludes suits against the government, while official
immunity is a more recent development devised to shield individual officials from
vexatious lawsuits. When specific relief is being sought, the distinction tends to blur.
See text accompanying notes 216-21 infra. But when, as in the instant case, damages
are sought, the suit is clearly against the individual official and the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity is inapplicable. See Hill, supra note 14, at 1147.
19. 276 F. Supp. 12, 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). In fact, the court denied a motion for
NOTES
Judge Bruchhausen held that (1) Bivens' claim did not come within
the general federal question jurisdiction;20 (2) federal agents who ex-
ceed their authority no longer represent the government and therefore
cannot be charged with the requisite governmental action prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment; 21 (3) the amendment did not create a new
federal right, but merely gave constitutional protection to the pre-exist-
ing common-law rights found in the states' tort law;22 (4) the federal
courts cannot afford a remedy for the violation of a constitutional
provision without express authorization from Congress or the Consti-
tution;23 and (5) federal agents are immune from suit for actions
which would ordinarily fulfill the purposes of the authority granted to
them.24  Bivens' complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction 25 and
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 27 expressly disagreed
with three of the district court's conclusions. In particular, it found
that (1) the district court had jurisdiction; 28 (2) the agents, even if
without actual authority as a result of their alleged unconstitutional con-
duct, would still be acting under color of law so as to be within the
scope of the amendment;29 and (3) the federal courts have the power
to remedy the deprivation of established federal rights even absent spe-
cific congressional authorization. 0 Additionally, the court apparently
classified the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
as a federal right.3 1 However, the district court's dismissal on the mer-
its was affirmed32 on the ground that, absent express authorization, the
leave to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the appeal would be "frivolous."
Id. The denial was reversed by the court of appeals on July 12, 1968, at which time
Bivens' motion for assignment of counsel was also granted. 409 F.2d at 720.
20. 276 F. Supp. at 14-16.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 15-16.
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. at 16; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 720.
29. Id. at 721.
30. Id. at 722.
31. Id. The court of appeals never described the right as being state-created.
On the contrary, it repeatedly described it as a federal constitutional right. See, e.g.,
409 F.2d at 725. Further, the court's recognition of its power to afford a remedy
necessarily depended upon the existence of some federal right.
32. 409 F.2d at 726. Judge Waterman, concurring specially, felt that the federal
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federal courts should not afford a remedy unless it is essential to the
vindication of the constitutional right."8 The court did not reach the
immunity issue.84
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, 3 rejected
the essentiality standard of the lower court and held that the federal
courts may use any normally available remedy to ameliorate wrongs
done.36 Under this test, Bivens was "entitled to recover money dam-
ages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation
of the Amendment. '8 7  Justice Harlan filed a separate concurring
opinion which elaborated certain of the issues covered cursorily by the
majority.3 The Chief Justice and Justice Black each filed separate
dissenting opinions, questioning the constitutional power of the Court
to afford a damage remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in the
absence of legislation creating such a cause of action. 9 Justice Black-
mun dissented in a separate opinion which primarily adopted the rea-
soning of the court of appeals.4" Since the immunity issue had not
been decided by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court did not con-
sider the issue either, but reversed the decision of the court of appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 41
The district court clearly erred in its disposition of the jurisdictional
and governmental action issues. It has been the rule since the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bell v. Hood4 2 that:
[W]here the complaint . ..is so drawn as to seek recovery directly
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court
... must entertain the suit....
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to con-
tend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of
action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well set-
tled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judg-
ment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
48
courts should entertain the cause of action without waiting for express statutory au-
thorization. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 720.
35. Majority opinion by Justice Brennan with whom Justices Douglas, Marshall,
Stewart and White joined, 403 U.S. at 389.
36. Id. at 397.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 398.
39. Id. at 411, 427.
40. Id. at 430.
41. Id. at 397-98.
42. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
43. Id. at 681-82. The Court noted two situations where a dismissal for want of
[Vol. 5
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The basic issues raised in Bell were identical to those raised in the in-
stant case. The petitioners in Bell were seeking, solely on the author-
ity of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the general grant of fed-
eral question jurisdiction,44 to recover damages for alleged unreason-
able searches and seizures and unauthorized and unjustified imprison-
ments.45  The Bell Court held that the district court had jurisdiction,46
since "the complaint does in fact raise serious questions, both of law
and fact, which the district court can decide only after it has assumed
jurisdiction over the controversy."4 7  The court of appeals in Bivens
recognized the Bell decision as clearly compelling the conclusion that
the district court had jurisdiction over Bivens' claim.48  The Supreme
Court did not discuss the issue.
49
The district court also improperly applied the requirement of gov-
ernmental action. The fact that the government official has exceeded his
authority by engaging in constitutionally impermissible conduct does
not thereby deprive his activities of their governmental character. He
continues to wear the same uniform; that is, he continues to act "under
color of" law.5" The court of appeals in Bivens emphatically reiterated
this principle as applied to unconstitutional searches by federal officials:
jurisdiction would be justified: (1) where the alleged claim under the Constitution or
federal statutes is clearly immaterial and was made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction and (2) where the claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Id. at
682-83.
44. Id. at 683.
45. Id. The addition of the Fifth Amendment claim of "unjustified imprisonment"
added nothing to the underlying issues of law raised by the Fourth Amendment claim.
46. Id. at 685.
47. Id. at 683-84. Upon the remand, the district court ruled against the petitioners
on every one of the non-jurisdictional issues. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal.
1947). No appeal was taken, despite the encouraging tenor of the Supreme Court's
opinion. See text accompanying notes 105-116 infra.
48. 409 F.2d at 720.
49. The sole reference to this issue is contained in Justice Harlan's summary of the
court of appeals' decision. 403 U.S. at 398-99.
50. A famous statement of this principle is contained in Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913):
[Tlhe proposition is that the [Fourteenth] Amendment deals only with the acts
of state officers within the strict scope of the public powers possessed by them
and does not include an abuse of power by an officer as the result of a wrong done
in excess of the power delegated. . . . [The amendment] provides . . . for a
case where one who is in possession of state power uses that power to the doing
of the wrongs which the Amendment forbids even although the consummation of
the wrong may not be within the powers possessed if the commission of the
wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aided by the state authority
lodged in the wrongdoer. That is to say, the theory of the Amendment is that
where an officer or other representative of a State in the exercise of the au-
thority with which he is clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong for-
bidden by the Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the state has authorized
the wrong is irrelevant and the Federal judicial power is competent to afford re-
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The fact that the officers were acting in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment's restraints upon governmental action does not belie the plain fact
that they were acting as governmental officials, and not in a private
capacity. It was from the federal government that they drew their ap-
parent authority, such that reasonable citizens could not have been ex-
pected to resist their unconstitutional intrusion. Action under color of
law, which utilizes the power of official position, must be deemed within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 51
The governmental action issue, like the jurisdictional issue, was not ex-
plicitly discussed by any of the members of the Supreme Court.52 Rath-
er, the two issues having been properly disposed of by the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court turned immediately to a consideration of
the remaining non-jurisdictional issues left unresolved in Bell.
I. THE SOURCE OF THE RIGHT
The respondents contended that the Fourth Amendment is not itself
the source of any independent federal right upon which a federal cause
of action could be based. The amendment, they asserted, serves merely
to preclude the defense of federal authority in state tort suits. r There-
fore, the only rights violated by an unreasonable search and seizure are
rights under state law.54 The amendment did not establish any federal
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and thus can-
dress for the wrong by dealing with the officer and the result of his exertion of
power. Id. at 287.
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Hill, supra note 14, at 1146-47. The
failure of some of the federal courts to distinguish between the officer's authority
and his official character has led them to assert equitable power over him when he
threatens to act unconstitutionally while rejecting any power over him once he has
actually acted, on the ground that, by his unconstitutional act, he has transformed
himself (unbeknownst to the victim, of course) from a federal official into an every-
day private individual. Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1957);
Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 316 F.2d 1, 2 (9th
Cir. 1957); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1947). The logic of such a
position has been characterized as "patently absurd." Katz, supra note 15, at 4.
51. 409 F.2d at 721.
52. The majority, however, while discussing the effects of an unconstitutional exer-
cise of federal authority, noted that "power, once granted, does not disappear like a
magic gift when it is wrongfully used." 403 U.S. at 392.
53. Brief for Respondents at 10-12, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Respondents'
Brief].
54. The rights would ordinarily be asserted in a trespass action. See, e.g., Bates v.
Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865); Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851).
NOTES
not be the basis for a federal cause of action. Three arguments were
advanced in support of this assertion.
The first argument was based upon a strict interpretation of four
English cases which were decided less than thirty years prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in America."u These cases, and espe-
cially Entick v. Carrington,56 have been generally acknowledged as
the primary source of the Fourth Amendment.17 They arose from tres-
pass actions brought against British officers who had executed general
warrants issued by Lord Halifax. The officers sought to avoid liability
under the "special justification" that their actions were authorized by
the general warrants. 58  In each case, however, the courts found the
warrants to be unlawful, rejected the defense of special justification, and
sustained substantial damage awards.50 The respondents in Bivens ar-
gued that the Fourth Amendment should be read only as a reaffirmation
of the principle expressly established in those cases, i.e., "that an un-
lawful warrant could not serve as a defense to a common law trespass
action."6
The second argument was based upon the wording of the amendment
itself, which "did not purport to create the right to be secure from un-
reasonable searches and seizures but merely stated it as a right which
already existed." 61  Assuming that this prior-existing right was a crea-
ture of state law rather than a fundamental or "natural" right which
individuals hold against the power of the government,62 the respond-
ents concluded that the Fourth Amendment by its very words merely
protects certain state-created rights from federal encroachment. 63
55. Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765); Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v.
Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
56. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
57. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); N. LAssoN, TIM HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUION
(1937) [hereinafter cited as LASSON].
58. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 9.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. The respondents' recognition of the fact that the Fourth Amendment was
intended as a guarantee that federal officials would be liable in damages for common
law trespass even if acting pursuant to a warrant, if the warrant were unlawful, seems
more than a little inconsistent with their claim of official immunity from suit for
searches allegedly conducted without any warrant or probable cause. See text accom-
panying notes 194-96 infra.
61. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 11 n.7, quoting LAssoN, supra note 57, at
100 n.77.
62. See note 96 and text accompanying note 102 infra.
63. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 11 & n.7.
1972]
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The third argument was based upon Congress's failure to grant the
lower federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitu-
tion until late in the nineteenth century. 64  If the framers intended to
create a new federal action for damages, reasoned the respondents,
they surely would have provided a federal forum to entertain the ac-
tions.
65
The respondents' restrictive reading of the Fourth Amendment
was not adhered to by any of the Justices. It was expressly rejected
by Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,"6 and Justice Harlan, con-
curring. 67 Justice Blackmun adopted the opinion of the court of ap-
peals,6 which had characterized the right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures as "an established federal right." 9  The
Chief Justice and Justice Black failed to discuss the issue, but both ap-
parently acknowledged the federal source of the right.70
Justice Brennan rejected the respondents' view of the Fourth Amend-
ment as being contrary to a large body of decisional law which demon-
strates that (1) the relationship between a private individual and a fed-
eral agent who unconstitutionally asserts his authority is more one-
sided than the similar relationship between a private individual and a
private trespassor; 71 (2) state tort law and the Fourth Amendment, be-
ing concerned with different relationships, often protect interests which
may be inconsistent or even hostile; 72 (3) the Fourth Amendment is an
independent limitation on the exercise of federal authority that applies
64. General "federal question" jurisdiction was not conferred on the lower federal
courts until 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470.
65. The respondents invoked the words of Chief Justice Marshall:
And if the seizure be finally adjudged wrongful, and without reasonable cause, he
may proceed, at his election, by a suit at common law ...for damages for the
illegal act. Yet, even in that case, any remedy which the law may afford to the
party supposing himself to be aggrieved . . . could be prosecuted only in the
state court. . . . Congress has refused to the courts of the Union the power of
deciding on the conduct of their officers, in the execution of their laws, in suits
at common-aw, until the case shall have passed through the state courts, and
have received the form which may there be given it. Respondents' Brief, supra
note 53, at 12-13, quoting Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. 1, 9, 2 Wheat. 1, 10
(1817).
Chief Justice Marshall appears merely to have been reciting the lack of federal
question jurisdiction. The statement says nothing about the reasons for withholding
that jurisdiction. It also sheds no light on the source of the right. See text accom-
panying notes 103-04 infra.
66. 403 U.S. at 391.
67. Id. at 400.
68. Id. at 430.
69. 409 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added). See note 31 Tupra.
70. 403 U.S. at 415, 429.
71. Id. at 392, 394-95.
72. Id. at 394,
NOTES
even when the conduct in question is not condemned by state law;73
and (4) state law cannot limit the extent to which federal authority
is exercised.
74
The Court has recognized, Justice Brennan explained, that a person
confronted with an intrusion under color of government authority is in
a far different position than a person confronted with an intrusion by a
private citizen. 75  In the latter situation, the attempted intrusion usu-
ally can be fended off by locking the door or by resort to the local po-
lice.76 But a person faced with an unlawful intrusion by a government
agent will ordinarily find resistance to be futile,7 7 and perhaps unlaw-
ful in itself,78 even assuming he would have the boldness to question
the agent's authority. Usually the mere assertion of governmental au-
thority will unlock the door.79  The attempt to treat a federal agent
who has violated the Fourth Amendment as just another private citizen
"ignore[s] the fact that power, once granted, does not disappear like a
magic gift when it is wrongfully used."80
Since the relationships created by governmental intrusions are mark-
edly different than those created by private intrusions, it should hardly
be surprising to find that the interests protected by state tort law are
often different than those protected by the Fourth Amendment.
81
State tort law, being concerned with the relationships between private
individuals, assumes that ordinarily a person will be willing and able to
resist undesired intrusions. Thus, a private individual, relying only
on his own authority, yill ordinarily not be liable in trespass if he de-
mands, and is granted, admission to another's home. 82 Furthermore,
the same individual will usually not be liable for trespass beyond the
73. Id. at 392-94.
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id. at 394.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1961); cf. United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882).
78. 403 U.S. at 395 n.8; see People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1969).
79. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 219 (1946) (Murphy,
J., dissenting); see Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (assertion of
governmental authority by federal agents resulted in implied coercion); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914).
80. 403 U.S. at 392.
81. Id. at 394.
82. Id., citing W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 109-10 (3d ed. 1964); 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.11 (1956).
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bounds of his invitation absent clear notice to that effect.83 Yet the
same conduct by a government agent is prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.
84
Justice Brennan contended that the Fourth Amendment operates
independently of state law as a limitation on the exercise of federal
authority,86 and in support thereof discussed two cases decided twenty
years before the Fourth Amendment was applied to the states in Wolf v.
Colorado.86  In Gambino v. United States8 7 the petitioners were arrested
by state police officers for the sole purpose of enforcing federal law.88
The arrests, although made without probable cause, were valid under
state law. 9 The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed the subsequent
federal convictions, which were based upon evidence seized incident to
the arrest, since the Fourth Amendment prohibits any searches and
arrests made for the purpose of enforcing federal law unless they are
supported by probable cause.90 Similarly, in Byars v. United States"1
a federal prohibition agent, along with state law enforcement officers,
engaged in a search pursuant to a state warrant. The warrant had been
issued without probable cause by a state judge for a state law offense.92
The petitioner was convicted of a federal crime as the result of evidence
seized in the search. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, ex-
pressly refusing to consider whether or not the warrant was valid under
state law "since in no event could it constitute the basis for a federal
83. 403 U.S. at 394-95 n.7, citing 1 F. HAmPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW Ov TO RTS
§ 1.11 (1956).
84. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (officer executing search
warrant must stay strictly within the bounds set by the warrant); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (consent of wife to search was obtained through "im-
plied coercion" in violation of Fourth Amendment). For a case carving out an ex-
ception to the Marron rule for instrumentalities of the crime, see United States v.
Alloway, 397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968). But see People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307,
244 N.E.2d 232, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968).
85. 403 U.S. at 392.
86. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Until Wolf, the Fourth Amendment was construed as a
limitation on the federal government only. Thus, actions of state officials in accord-
ance with state law could come under scrutiny only if they violated a limitation on
federal power independent of state law.
87. 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
88. Id. at 314-15.
89. 403 U.S. at 393 n.5. The state officers had apparently been directed by the
Governor to assist in the enforcement of federal law. id. at 393.
90. 275 U.S. at 313, 319.
91. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id. at 28-29.
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search and seizure."94  In both cases the Court found conduct which
did not impinge on any state-created rights to have been in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Justice Brennan observed, the
Court's recent decisions on electronic surveillance" "have made it clear
beyond peradventure that the Fourth Amendment is not tied to the
niceties of local trespass laws."
96
Finally, Justice Brennan pointed out that state law cannot limit the
extent to which federal power is exercised.97 Since state law can neither
limit the valid exercise of federal power nor authorize its invalid exer-
cise, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures per-
petrated by federal agents must derive from the Fourth Amendment it-
self."
Justice Harlan, concurring, initially noted that the presumed" avail-
ability of federal equitable relief for threatened violations of the Fourth
Amendment depends upon the presence of a substantive right derived
from federal law.100 He then addressed himself to the historical argu-
94. Id. at 29.
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (judicially unauthorized elec-
tronic bug on phone booth violates reasonable expectation of privacy); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (state statute authorizing indiscriminate use of electronic
eavesdropping devices is unconstitutional); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961) (eavesdropping via "spike mike" unconstitutional even if no technical
trespass under local property law relating to party walls).
96. 403 U.S. at 393-94. Consider also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949):
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door, whether by day
or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the
authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the
history and basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples. Id. at
27-28.
97. 403 U.S. at 395, citing In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), wherein the Court ruled
that a United States marshall who kills a person while protecting a United States judge
cannot be held to answer for murder in the state courts since his acts were authorized
by the laws of the United States. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490
(1944); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 506 (1858); Maun v. United States, 347 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1965).
But cf. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J.
1385 (1964).
98. 403 U.S. at 395.
99. Id. at 400. The presumption seems to be bottomed on an assertion of its
availability in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). For an example of such equi-
table relief under the Civil Rights Act, see Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th
Cir. 1966).
100. 403 U.S. at 400. See Hill, supra note 14, at 1124-31; note 144 infra.
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ments advanced by the respondents: 01
[As regards the source of the right], the choice of phraseology in the
Fourth Amendment itself is singularly unpersuasive. The leading argu-
ment against a "Bill of Rights" was the fear that individual liberties not
specified expressly would be taken as excluded. . . . This circum-
stance alone might well explain why the authors of the Bill of Rights
would opt for language which presumes the existence of a fundamental
interest in liberty, albeit originally derived from the common law.
10 2
Justice Harlan also discounted the significance of the framers' failure
to provide for the enforcement of the right in the lower federal courts,
noting that, at most, this failure merely reflected the framers' assump-
tion that the common law remedies would adequately vindicate the fed-
erally protected interest.' In other words, the framers' choice of
forum says nothing about the source of the right. The choice of forum
was just a manifestation of the framers' belief that the then stronger
states' courts would be more willing to protect the fundamental rights
of their respective residents from overreaching by the fledgling federal
government than would the courts of the federal government itself.
10 4
II. THE GENERAL REMEDIAL POWER
The next issue faced by the Court was the question of its power un-
der a general grant of jurisdiction to award Bivens damages for the
violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan
harked back to the Court's broad assertion of power in Bell v. Hood:'0 5
101. See text accompanying notes 55-65 supra.
102. 403 U.S. at 400-01 n.3, citing LAsSON, supra note 57, at 79-105.
103. 403 U.S. at 400-01 n.3. Two recent articles have pointed out that the Su-
premacy Clause makes the Constitution part of the common law of every state, en-
forceable through the normally available common law remedies. Hill, supra note 14,
at 1131-35; Katz, supra note 15, at 9-12, 33-34, 42-43. Thus, the enforcement of
constitutional commands by state suits does not imply that the underlying rights are
necessarily state-created.
104. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (Marshall, CJ.).
When a spirit of nationalism finally emerged after the Civil War, Congress for the
first time invested the lower federal courts with the broad "federal question" jurisdic-
tion, encompassing all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 727 (1953). This grant of jurisdiction enabled the federal courts for
the first time to take a positive, offense-oriented approach toward the Constitution by
entertaining original suits asserting individually vested constitutional rights as the basis
for relief against threatened or consummated federal action. Unfortunately, the
power has been largely unused for the past one hundred years.
105. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide
for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences
of its violation. But "it is . . . well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to
make good the wrong done." 108
Thus, in the majority's view, the power to afford a remedy is an inher-
ent part of the judicial function. In the federal courts this power is
limited by only two prerequisites: the invasion of a federal right (in
non-diversity cases) and the existence of a federal statute giving the
courts jurisdiction over cases revolving around that right. Once these
two prerequisites are met, the federal courts may afford any of the
normally available judicial remedies.1
0 7
The majority placed great emphasis upon the Court's previous state-
ments in Bell. Yet, as Justice Black pointed out in his dissent in Biv-
ens, Bell decided only the jurisdictional issue and expressly left open
the question of whether or not an unreasonable search by a federal of-
ficer in violation of the Fourth Amendment gave rise to a federal cause
of action for damages against the officer.1 08 Justice Black concluded
that the Court did not have the power to afford the damage remedy to
Bivens.1°9 Since Justice Black was the author of the Court's opinion
in Bell, he should speak authoritatively on questions concerning its
interpretation. However, a careful analysis reveals that the Bell Court
assumed the federal courts, given jurisdiction and the existence of a fed-
eral right, possessed the power to afford a remedy for a violation of that
right. Justice Black explained in Bell that the right of the petitioners
to recover depended upon both the interpretation given the statute
106. 403 U.S. at 396, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote
omitted).
107. The majority's strong belief in the federal courts' general remedial power is
evidenced by two additional references to the issue:
[The Fourth Amendment] guarantees to citzens of the United States the absolute
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of
federal authority. And "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief." 403 U.S. at 392, quoting Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. at 684 (footnote omitted).
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury conse-
quent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is
entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally
available in the federal courts. 'The very essence of civil liberty certainly con-
sists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury." 403 U.S. at 397 (citations omitted), quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 49-58, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
108. 403 U.S. at 427.
109. Id. at 428.
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which then conferred federal question jurisdiction"x0 and a determina-
tion of the scope of the Fourth and Fifth"' Amendments."2  The
answer to these questions was to be found in the resolution of two famil-
iar issues: (1) does the Fourth Amendment embody independent fed-
eral rights or is it merely a limitation on official defenses in state tres-
pass actions 13 and (2) do federal officials who exceed their authority
by violating the Fourth Amendment thereby become mere private citi-
zens not covered by the amendment's prohibitions?" 4  These issues
were to be determined by the district court upon the remand in Bell.1 5
If they were determined in favor of the petitioners, concluded Justice
Black, "the right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint
will be sustained." 1 6  Thus, Justice Black apparently recognized that
the only obstacles to the affording of a damage remedy in Bell were
the possible absence of a federal right and the possible inapplicability of
the Fourth Amendment to unauthorized acts of federal officials. Jus-
tice Black's views in Bell seem directly opposed to his position in the
instant case.
Both Justice Black and the Chief Justice condemned the majority
opinion in Bivens as an instance of judicial legislation." 7 Their failure
to elaborate on this point makes it difficult to discover the precise
grounds of their objection. On the most fundamental level, the issue
is whether the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the fed-
eral courts was intended to include a general remedial authority to
make good the deprivations of clearly established rights in cases where
the courts have jurisdiction. An extremely narrow view of the judicial
power would limit the federal courts to the granting of only those rem-
110. 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), now 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
111. The Fifth Amendment claim involved an asserted "deprivation of liberty without
due process of law" resulting from an "unauthorized and unjustified imprisonment."
327 U.S. at 683, 685.
112. Id. at 684-85.
113. Id. at 681-83.
114, Id. at 683.
115. Id. at 684-85. The district court subsequently ruled against the petitioners on
these and several other issues. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). No
appeal was taken.
116. 327 U.S. at 685. Justice Black cited several cases which supported the peti-
tioners' position: Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912) (federal courts can
issue injunctions against federal officials to protect rights guarded by the Constitution);
Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) (jurisdiction over suit to recover damages
for deprivation of constitutional right to vote was upheld); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S.
58 (1900) (same). For the complete list of cases cited see 327 U.S. at 684 nn. 3 & 4.
117. 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 411-12, 418, 422 (Burger, C,J.,
dissenting).
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edies expressly provided for in the definition of the right. This view
was apparently adopted by the Chief Justice"" and there are indica-
tions that it was central to Justice Black's position." 9 It is submitted
that such a view is contrary to both the jurisprudential theory prevalent
at the time the Constitution was adopted and the overwhelming weight
of authority ever since.
120
The framers of the Constitution relied upon the traditional notions
of the English common law. Their failure to provide expressly for
specific remedies for the violation of constitutional provisions harmon-
ized with the common law ethic.12 ' Indeed, the enumeration of spe-
cific remedies was probably not only thought of as unnecessary, but
also as undesirable since it might be taken as evidence of an intention
to exclude others.
In the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison,'2 2 Chief Justice Mar-
shall reaffirmed the common law principle "that every right, when with-
118. Id. at 411, 422.
119. Id. at 427-28. Justice Black's objection was concurrently phrased as disap-
proving the creation of a remedy and the creation of a right of action.
120. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1939) (American Indian whose land was taxed contrary to treaty and supporting
federal legislation was entitled to recover taxes despite absence of remedy for such a
situation in both treaty and statute-remedy judicially implied); Texas & N.O.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569-70 (1930) (statutory prohibition
against coercive measures sufficient basis for issuance of injunction against employer
attempting to force choice of particular union); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222,
229 (1901) (liability created by treaty or statute without a specific remedy can be
enforced through any of the common law remedies). See also the discussion of the
following cases elsewhere in this Note: J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964);
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62
(1900); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218-20 (1882); Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 49, 59, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803). Cf. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502,
506-10 (1954) (writ of coram nobis implied from general writ power in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1970)).
121. [Tihe English judiciary had for centuries been implementing the substantive
law by a remedial system that evolved through the common law process. I do not
find it strange that eighteenth century men may not have supposed that there
would be any difficulty of implementation so long as the Constitution was the
"Supreme Law of the Land" applicable in ordinary courts. Particularly is this
understandable given the fact that the interests in liberty were themselves the
product of judicial development. Katz, supra note 15, at 43 (footnote omitted).
See Hill, supra note 14, at 1131-35. For a thorough treatment of the development of
the English remedial system, see Katz, supra note 15, at 8-29. Further insight into the
thinking of the framers can be found in their reference to the writ of habeas corpus:
'"The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2. The language assumes the existence of the writ as a remedy inherent in
the judicial power.
122. 5 U.S. 49, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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held, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. '128  The
petitioner, invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, had
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to deliver
a judicial commission which had been signed by the President and
sealed by the Secretary of State of the previous administration. 4 Mar-
shall discussed various situations in which a federal statute imposed
specific duties on the head of a department, with individual rights de-
pending upon the performance of those duties.125  No sanctions were
imposed for the failure to perform the duties. But should the head of
the department refuse to perform a duty, reasoned Marshall, "can it be
imagined that the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy? It is
not believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain such
a proposition.' ' 26 Turning to the case at hand Marshall held that Mar-
bury, once he had been appointed to his judicial office by the President
and had been confirmed by the Senate, had thereby acquired a vested
right in his commission due to the constitutional limitations on removal
of judicial officers. The Secretary of State's subsequent interference
with that right was an injury for which Marbury was entitled to relief,
but no remedy could be afforded by the Supreme Court because the case
was not within the Court's original jurisdiction as defined in the Con-
stitution.127 That is, the remedial authority of the Court could not be
exercised since one of the two prerequisites (jurisdiction) was lacking.
The majority in Bivens discussed two cases which evidence the re-
medial principle recognized in Marbury. In Jacobs v. United
States,'28 the plaintiff sought compensation for the taking of his land
by flooding that resulted from the construction of a federal dam. The
Court allowed the recovery of the value of the land at the time of the
taking, plus interest thereafter. The action was brought under the
Tucker Act, which gave the district courts jurisdiction over claims
against the United States "not exceeding $10,000 founded upon the
Constitution."' 2  That act, however, merely conferred jurisdiction and
did not in itself create any rights or remedies. The Court emphasized
that the right to recover rested squarely upon the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against the taking of private property for public use with-
123. Id. at 59, 1 Cranch at 163, quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 109.
124. Id. at 50, 1 Cranch at 138.
125. Id. at 59-60, 1 Cranch at 164-65.
126. Id. at 60, 1 Cranch at 165.
127. Id. at 66-68, 1 Cranch 172-75.
128. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
129. 28 U.S.C. & 41(20) (1925).
[Vol. 5
NOTES
out paying just compensation. Thus, the recovery of the interest could
not be defeated on the ground that it was not authorized by statute as
long as such recovery was appropriate to the vindication of the right to
receive just compensation.'
30
Similarly, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak' 3' the Court in a unanimous
opinion reaffirmed the Bell Court's assertion of a broad remedial
power.132  The Borak Court declared that the grant of jurisdiction to
the district courts in the Securities Exchange Act of 19341'3 was suffi-
cient to enable the courts to enforce any duty or liability created by the
act by affording to a private stockholder any normally available remedy
that was necessary or appropriate to the protection of investors.' 34 This
was done, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurring opinion in
Bivens, despite the existence of an elaborate and comprehensive ad-
ministrative enforcement scheme which made it clear that Congress it-
self had not intended to create a private damage remedy. That is, rath-
er than the remedy being implied through statutory construction, it
was afforded pursuant to the power of the federal courts, given the req-
uisite jurisdiction, to choose among "traditionally available judicial rem-
edies . . . [to effectuate] the substantive social policy embodied in
an act of positive law."' 35
Borak went further than any of the cases previously mentioned. In-
stead of merely applying the federal courts' general remedial power to
the vindication of a private right clearly established in the Constitution
or a federal statute, the Court initially "implied" the private right from
a broadly phrased duty and then applied the general remedial authority.
Though the creation of a right seems more legislative than the afford-
ing of a remedy, no Justice argued that the result reached in Borak
was an -unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. 36 Furthermore,
even bolder assertions of the power of the federal courts to create sub-
stantive law in areas of national concern have been made and have
been generally accepted.137
130. 290 U.S. at 16, 17.
131. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
132. Id. at 433.
133. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78(a) (1970)).
134. 377 U.S. at 432-34.
135. 403 U.S. at 402-03 n.4.
136. An earlier assertion of the argument failed in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-04 (1967); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944).
137. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal courts can
19721
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The Bivens majority is thus merely invoking well-settled principles
of decisional law when it declares that a federal court, vested with the
requisite jurisdiction, possesses the inherent power to remedy the dep-
rivation of an individual's clearly established federal right by resort
to any one of the traditional judicial remedies.""8 The Fourth Amend-
ment was specifically created to protect each individual's federal right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.' 81 Bivens has al-
leged a violation of this constitutional right, properly invoking the fed-
eral courts' general federal question jurisdiction. What, then, do the
Chief Justice and Justice Black see in this particular claim which would
place it outside the scope of the federal courts' general remedial power?
The peculiarity cannot be the supposed creation of a new federal
right, since the federal nature of the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures has been recognized for some time.140  Nor, as
Justice Harlan pointed out,' 4' can it be the decision to afford a damage
remedy without explicit congressional authorization, since that has
been done many times.142  Nor could it be the constitutional status of
fashion rules to govern transactions in United States' commercial paper); see C.
WluG rr, FEDERAL CouRTs § 60 (2d ed. 1970); Katz, supra note 15, at ,58-74;
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD o
N.Y.C.B.A. 64 (1964); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947)
(federal courts have power to create a cause of action in favor of the United States
against third parties who injure United States soldiers).
138. Some authorities have even suggested that both state and federal courts have
the duty, in such a situation, to afford an appropriate traditional remedy, if one exists.
Hill, supra note 14, at 1111-18; Katz, supra note 15, at 18, 35. See Justice Harlan's
apparent acceptance of this proposition in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 408 n.8. Cf. Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Miles v. Illinois
Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942), rehearing denied, 316 U.S. 708 (1942); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 49, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); C. WRIrr, FEDERAL CouaTs § 45 (2d
ed. 1970).
139. See text accompanying notes 55-60 & 101 supra, and notes 143, 156, & 193-94
infra.
140. See text accompanying notes 53-104 supra. Furthermore, the federal courts
have actually created new rights in several instances. See notes 136-37 supra.
141. 403 U.S. at 402.
142. See, e.g., 1.. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). Furthermore, to label the decision to afford a damage rem-
edy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment as a question of policy is to ignore a
basic purpose of the amendment, which was to protect the damage remedy as estab-
lished by the English common law cases from nullification by the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of the federal government. See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
Policy questions seem much more evident in cases like Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959), where traditional rights and remedies were completely annihilated without
any mandate from Congress or the Constitution. Barr is discussed in text accom-
panying notes 210-15 infra.
the right In considering this possibility, Justice Harlan observed that:
[I]t would at least be anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary
-while competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial
remedies to implement statutory and common-law policies, and even
to generate substantive rules governing primary behavior in further-
ance of broadly formulated policies articulated by statute or Constitu-
tion-is powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social poli-
cies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed
predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the
popular will.' 4
3
Justice Harlan pointed out that federal equitable relief has traditionally
been available when constitutional rights were threatened, so that the
mere status of the right as constitutional does not render the courts
powerless in the absence of congressional authorization. 144  Justice
Harlan concluded there was no peculiarity involved in the case, and that,
if the general grant of federal question jurisdiction can support equi-
table relief, it is also sufficient to empower the federal courts to grant a
traditional remedy at law.145
IR. THE CRITERIA FOR EXERCISING THE POWER
Having determined that the federal courts have the power to afford
any normally available remedy to a person who has been deprived of a
constitutional right, the Court finally turned to the problem of deciding
what criteria should govern the exercise of that power. The Govern-
ment argued that the federal courts, in the absence of statutory authori-
zation, should exercise their inherent power to afford a traditional
remedy at the behest of a litigant only when the failure to do so would
render the constitutional provision "a mere abstract pronouncement"'1 4
This "essentiality" standard, 147 said the Government, was the basis for
the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,'
48
143. 403 U.S. at 403-04 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 404. See cases cited in note 14 supra, two of which involved the award-
ing of damages. The cases are discussed in Hill, supra note 14, at 1125. As for the
suggestion by the court of appeals that the injunctive remedy might be distinguishable
from the other remedies since it is inherently necessary to the power of judicial review
(409 F.2d at 723), consider Hill's claim that most of the major constitutional cases in
the early history of the United States were actions at law, and that, furthermore, most
of them were decided by rejecting the proposed remedy. Hill, supra note 14, at 1150
n.178.
145. 403 U.S. at 405.
146. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 16.
147. See id. at 19.
148. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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the affording of injunctive relief against the enforcement of unconsti-
tutional state statutes in Ex parte Young, 140 and the awarding of com-
pensation for the taking of land in Jacobs v. United States."'0
Both the court of appeals and Justice Blackmun supported the es-
sentiality standard urged by the Government. 5 ' The majority of the
Court, however, refused to accept such a test. They held that the fed-
eral courts can redress a constitutional wrong by affording any nor-
mally available traditional remedy, at least absent an explicit congres-
sional declaration establishing an exclusive remedy "equally effective in
the view of Congress."' 52 Justice Harlan concurred in this view, noting
that even the Government had conceded the standard for affording a
damage remedy where statutory policies are concerned is one of neces-
sity' 53 or appropriateness.' 54
The Government attempted to justify a stricter standard for constitu-
tionally implied remedies on the ground that there would be substan-
tial doubt concerning the power of Congress to revoke or even modify
remedies bottomed on the Constitution. 55  Justice Harlan, though ex-
pressly declining to consider this question of congressional power, felt
the argument for a more stringent standard in constitutional cases nev-
ertheless could not prevail:
149. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
150. 290 U.S. 13 (1933). Although the recovery of the value of the land at the
time of the taking was considered essential to vindication of the Fifth Amendment, the
additional recovery of interest was justified not as being essential but as being appro-
priate. See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra; cf. Board of County Comm'rs v.
United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939). The court of appeals in Bivens failed to make
this distinction. 409 F.2d at 723.
151. 409 F.2d at 722-24; 403 U.S. at 430. But cf. Hill, supra note 14, at 1125.
152. 403 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 406. Justice Harlan's juxtaposition of the word "necessary" with the
word "appropriate" was in deference to the Court's previous opinions in J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), and United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301, 307 (1947). The word "necessary," however, when used in this context, clearly
does not import essentiality:
Does [the word "necessary"] always import an absolute physical necessity, so
strong, that one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist
without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use, in the
common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that it frequently
imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to an-
other. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J., construing the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution).
See id. at 413-15, 418-21. In Bivens, both the majority and Justice Harlan clearly pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the only criterion was appropriateness.
154. 403 U.S. at 406, citing J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
155. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 21-22. See Katz, supra note 15, at
41 n.221; Hill, supra note 14, at 1116-18, 1152-53.
[T]he Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests
of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legis-
lative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropri-
ate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial
relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests
protected by federal statutes.156
'Justice Harlan also observed that Mapp v. OhioM5 7 was inapposite, since
the remedy afforded there was not a traditionally available form of ju-
dicial relief.
158
Both the majority and Justice Harlan determined that the damage
remedy is appropriate to the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Brennan pointed out that damages have been the remedy tra-
ditionally afforded for invasions of personal interests in liberty.'8 9 An
individual is entitled to be compensated for his injuries regardless of
whether or not such compensation will deter future injuries.' 60 Fur-
ther, the decision to afford the remedy does not involve policy consider-
ations that would be better left to Congress,' 8' since the policy behind
the Fourth Amendment is clear.162  Justice Harlan added that the dam-
age remedy is the only possible remedy for an innocent victim of an
illegal search. 63  The exclusionary rule aids only the criuinal' 64 and
injunctive relief is only relevant when the intended victim has been
subjected to repeated unconstitutional intrusions or when he has suf-
ficient advance notice of the search.
The Government responded that, nevertheless, a federal damage
remedy was unnecessary since federal officers can be sued as private
156. 403 U.S. at 407. See Katz, supra note 15, at 33, 40-41.
157. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
158. See 403 U.S. at 408 n.8. The exclusionary rule was initially applied to the fed-
eral government in 1914. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). It was not ap-
plied to the states until 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). An application of
the rule involves the exclusion of relevant evidence from a criminal trial-hardly a
traditional civil or equitable (or even criminal) remedy.
159. 403 U.S. at 395-96, citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902);
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894); Lammon v.
Feusier, 111 U.S. 17 (1884); J. LANDYNsns, SEARCH AND Sizunn AND THm SUPREmm
COURT 28 (1966); LAssoN, supra note 57, at 43; Katz, supra note 15, at 8-33.
160. See 403 U.S. at 397; id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 396. Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947),
wherein the Court dealt with questions of federal fiscal policy.
162. See text accompanying notes 55-60, 101, 143 & 156 supra, 192-94 iufra.
163. 403 U.S. at 409-10.
164. Chief Justice Burger's dissent was almost exclusively devoted to an elaboration
of this point. See 403 U.S. at 411-27; text accompanying notes 241-45, 251-55 infra.
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individuals under state tort law in order to obtain compensatory re-
lief.165 The Government conceded that often the compensation would
be minimal, since many states required that actual physical harm or
malice be shown before exemplary damages can be recovered. Some
states further completely prohibit the recovery of punitive damages and
restrict the recovery of damages for emotional harm (if any are al-
lowed at all) to situations where the search took place in the owner's
presence.166 The Government attempted to minimize the obvious in-
adequacies of this remedial scheme, particularly as applied to surrepti-
tious governmental intrusions, by the assurance that, absent the own-
er's consent or presence, it was "improbable" that a federal agent could
gain entry without causing some actual damage.0 7
Even admitting the inadequacy of state recoveries, continued the
Government, there is no reason to believe that a federal cause of action
would fare any better. It would no doubt be extremely similar to the
already existing federal cause of action against state officers afforded
by 42 U.S.C. section 1983.08 Yet, claimed the Government, it could
only find fifteen cases alleging illegal searches and seizures in the
cumulative annotations to that statute, and such a dearth of suits should
suggest that the proposed federal cause of action against federal officers
would be no more effective than the existing actions under state tort
law.
10 9
165. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 34.
166. Id. at 34-37.
167. Id. at 35. The victim might appreciate this mixed blessing, but it doesn't say
much for the training of government agents.
168. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
The statute was initially enacted in 1871, four years prior to the initial enactment of
the statute conferring general federal question jurisdiction. Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
169. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 27. Although the cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is gaining more in popularity each year, it will not become really
effective until it completely rids itself of the remedial limitations borrowed from state
tort law, thus making available the full range of the courts' general remedial power.
Compare Knuckles v. Prasse, 435 F.2d 1255, 1257 (3d Cir. 1970) (prisoners sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishment for two and one-half days not even entitled to
nominal damages) and Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 143-44 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (prisoner confined completely nude for several days in a segregation cell stripped
of all furnishings was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, but not entitled to
punitive damages since no evidence of deliberateness or recklessness!) with Donovan
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Justice Harlan was not impressed by this argument. The primary
reason advanced by the Government for the failure of private individ-
uals to bring damage actions was the perceived difficulty of recovery."'
The majority had demonstrated the inability of state tort law-which
is concerned primarily with privately inflicted injury-to properly pro-
vide for the substantially different injuries inflicted by government
agents. 1" Justice Harlan concluded that these differences in type and
magnitude of injury argue in favor of a federal damage remedy un-
fettered by the limitations on state tort actions.'Y2 Furthermore, fed-
eral law already controls the scope of the Fourth Amendment right' 3
and the extent of official defenses to liability.'7 4  The forum will al-
ways be federal, since the government removes all state suits against
its officers to the federal courts. 75 It would be anomalous to have
state law control the damages recoverable in a federal trial for the vio-
lation of a federal right by a federal official. Since the states have
little interest in the liability of federal officials, the extent of recovery for
deprivation of a constitutional right should not depend fortuitously on
the state in which the deprivation occurs, but should be determined by
uniform rules of federal law.'
76
v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1970) (damages can be awarded for emo-
tional and mental distress caused by police officers' intentional torts) and Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 885-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (punitive damages recoverable
by prisoner subjected to punitive segregation in violation of his federal rights). See
also Addickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232-34 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (denial of constitutional right by action clearly prohibited by federal statute
or Supreme Court decision is, as a matter of law, reckless disregard of right and
punitive damages may therefore be awarded); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87
(1965) (exemplary or punitive damages recoverable without allegation of nominal
damages).
170. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 27-28.
171. See text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
172. 403 U.S. at 409. See Hill, supra note 14, at 1151; note 169 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 85-97 supra.
174. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
194-95 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959).
175. 403 U.S. at 391. Considering this policy of removal, Justice Brennan found it
hard to understand Justice Blackmun's lament that recognition of the federal cause
of action "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal cases." Id. at n.4. And,
as Justice Harlan made clear, closing the doors on constitutionally protected interests
solely for reasons of judicial economy is well-nigh indefensible. Id. at 410-11.
Justice Blackmun's belief that the decision will increase the burden on law enforce-
ment officers is also hard to understand, since he himself assumed that "other
quite adequate remedies have always been available." Id. at 430. Under that as-
sumption, there should not be any increase in law suits.
176. 403 U.S. at 409. Cf. Hill, supra note 14, at 1121, 1145, 1151-53.
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IV. Tim OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
In order to avoid a pyrrhic victory on the three preceding issues,
Bivens must surmount one additional hurdle before he can return to
the trial court to await an answer to the complaint he filed more than
four years ago.177  That hurdle is the question of the applicability of
the doctrine of official immunity, an issue remanded by the Supreme
Court for original determination by the court of appeals.'78
The doctrine of official immunity has been judicially devised to
protect government officials from the burden of a multiplicity of vexa-
tious damage suits based on actions taken or decisions made in the per-
formance of their official duties.'Y9 If the official's action was within
the scope of his duties, he enjoys an absolute immunity from suit for
any injuries caused by the action.8 0 The doctrine was initially limited
to judges,' but has since been extended to include executive 8 2 and ad-
ministrativel 8  officers. The members of Congress, of course, enjoy
a constitutionally mandated, but limited, immunity.1
84
Several tests have been formulated to determine the applicability of
the doctrine to any particular situation. The first test applied only to
judicial officers and denied them immunity for actions taken when they
"clearly [and knowingly possessed] no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.1' 8 5 A subsequent test protected executive "action having more
or less connection with the general matters committed by law to [the
officer's] control or supervision," specifically excluding "matters which
are manifestly or palpably beyond [the official's] authority." 80 A
more recent test protects. actions taken "within the outer perimeter of
[the official's] line of duty."' 87 These tests essentially mandate that
the official will not be immune from suit when the challenged action
177. The complaint was filed on July 7, 1967, and was dismissed before any answer
was filed. 403 U.S. at 389-90.
178. Id. at 398. For the distinction between official and sovereign immunity, see
note 18 supra.
179. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
180. See cases cited in note 179 supra.
181. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (Justice of the Supreme
Court of District of Columbia).
182. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 493-99 (1896) (Postmaster General).
183. Barr v. "Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959) (Acting Director of Office of
Rent Stabilization).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
185. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871).
186. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
187. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
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was clearly unrelated to or inconsistent with the duties imposed on the
official by law.
Two questions arise in considering the applicability of the official im-
munity doctrine to the instant case. First, can an unconstitutional act
ever be said to be within the scope of an official's duties? Second,
should an official ever receive protection (and if so, how much) for
acts taken beyond the scope of his authority?
It is submitted that an unconstitutional act can never be within the
scope of official duty. A paramount duty of every United States citi-
zen should be to follow the mandates of federal law, whether it be con-
stitutional, 8 statutory,189 or decisional' 9 law. The framers of the
Constitution took particular care to make this paramount duty binding
on all government officials by requiring that all state and federal of-
ficials be bound by oath to support the Constitution of the United
States.' 91 Unconstitutional action by a federal official is a direct re-
pudiation of this oath. Such action, no matter how strongly related to
the official's immediate responsibilities, is clearly inconsistent with the
totality of duties imposed on him by federal law, and the doctrine of
official immunity should not apply.
The Bill of Rights, as part of the Constitution, is the "supreme Law
of the Land."' 92  It was added to the Constitution in order to guaran-
tee that the federal government would never be able to justify the in-
fringement of certain fundamental rights.'93 Nowhere is this purpose
clearer than in the Fourth Amendment, as the Government itself empha-
sized in its brief:
In America, as in England, government officers were to be subject to
the same common-law actions for damages as those applicable to pri-
vate persons. And the Fourth Amendment insured that when the
Amendment's proscriptions had not been followed, the officers would
be precluded from justifying [the] infringement . ..
188. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1949); Mont-
gomery v. State, 55 Fla. 97, 45 So. 879 (1908).
189. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1949); Miles v.
Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698 (1942); Parker v. State, 57 N.Y.S.2d 242, 185 Misc.
584 (1945).
190. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Mere-
dith v. Fair, 328 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1962); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,
188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
191. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,
524-25 (1858).
192. U.S. CoNSr. art. VI, cl. 2.
193. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (Marshall, CJ.).
See text accompanying notes 142 & 155 supra.
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* . [The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to foreclose the
defense of justification .... 194
Yet, in the court of appeals, the Government had insisted that, even if
Bivens' complaint alleged a clear and conscious violation of his Fourth
Amendment fights, he would nonetheless be precluded from bringing
a suit for damages:
[Tlhe immunity doctrine represents a judgment that the withholding
of a civil damages remedy in such cases is a necessary price to pay in
order to protect law enforcement officials from the requirement of go-
ing to trial in every case in which an arrested person alleges a clear
violation of his rights. 195
In other words, the mere possibility of inconveniencing the efficient
functioning of the federal juggernaut outweighs the individual's right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. It is hard to imag-
ine a contention so clearly in opposition to the words, purpose, and
spirit of the Fourth Amendment."0 6
The same contention was explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Hughes v. Johnson:m "
The question is whether a search without warrant and unsupported by
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, can be said to fall within the scope of the official duties
of these appellees. In our view, it cannot, and accordingly immunity
does not extend to such conduct. 198
However, in the amazing case of Norton v. McShane0 0 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that federal officials were immune
from suit despite allegations of (1) unlawful and malicious arrest
194. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53, at 10-11.
195. Brief for Respondents before the court of appeals at 27, Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969).
196. See text accompanying notes 55-60, 101, 143, 156, & 192-94 supra. The
Government inadvertently suggested an appropriate response to its audacious assertion
in its discussion of one of the early English search and seizure cases wherein
[the defendant officers] had claimed the verdict of £ 300 was excessive and
moved for a new trial. But Chief Justice Pratt, later Lord Camden, although
noting that £ 20 might have been sufficient, sustained the jury's award of ex-
emplary damages on the basis that the "tyrannical and severe manner" in which
the King's counsel and the Solicitor of the Treasury had insisted on the legality
of the warrants justified the jury's response. Respondents' Brief, supra note 53,
at 10 n.4, quoting Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (C.P. 1763).
197. 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
198. Id. at 70. Accord, Allen v. Merovka, 382 F.2d 589, 591-92 (10th Cir. 1967);
cf. Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968); Anderson v. Haas, 341 F.2d 497
(3d Cir. 1965).
199. 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965). Cf.
Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
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without probable cause, (2) malicious detainment without charges for
twenty-one hours (eighteen of which were spent in a forced rigid position
with no food, drink, or speech allowed), (3) forced witnessing of
horrible and nauseating mistreatment of others, (4) fingerprinting,
(5) mugging, (6) further vile abuse and mistreatment, (7) malicious
assault and battery with a large stick or billy club, and (8) conspiracy
to deny equal protection of the laws, equal privileges and immunities
under the laws, and equal protection by state authorities..2 00 The Norton
case arose from several suits brought in the state courts which were sub-
sequently removed to the federal courts by the defendant federal officials
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1442(a) .201 The Norton majority treated
the allegations as simple tort claims, studiously avoiding any reference
to constitutional rights. The holding in Hughes was dismissed in a
footnote as dicta.202 The majority then ruefully concluded that "con-
sideration[s] of public policy [forced it to leave] the extremely aggravated
wrongs as alleged in the complaint . . . unredressed.
' 20 3
Judge Gewin filed a blistering dissent,20 4 stressing that the complaint
did not allege mere negligent performance of official duties, but rath-
er patent denials of fundamental constitutional rights, backed up by
substantial factual allegations.20 5 He insisted that:
[N]o officer can unlawfully, willfully, maliciously and without prob-
able cause-all as alleged in the complaint-deny a citizen his con-
stitutional rights and then claim that the acts involved ". . . have more
or less connection with the general matters committed by law to the offi-
cer's control ... ." It is a paradox to say that an unlawful, willful
and malicious violation of the United States Constitution has ever, by
any decree or any other authority, been "committed by law" to the con-
trol or supervision of any officer, regardless of his rank or station in the
government. At the very instant a violation of the Constitution is
shown by willful, malicious and unlawful acts, support of the law is re-
moved. Such willful, malicious and unlawful conduct in violation of
the Constitution can never reach the "outer perimeter" of any authority;
it cannot be within the "scope of authority," and no man is given "a dis-
200. 332 F.2d at 857.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 860 n.6. The so-called "dicta" was the sole reason for the reversal in
Hughes. 305 F.2d at 70.
203. 332 F.2d at 861. The public policy was the familiar apprehension concerning
a cascade of vexatious suits. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
204. 332 F.2d at 863.
205. Id. The distinction was clearly drawn in Chavez v. Kelly, 364 F.2d 113,
115 (10th Cir. 1966).
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cretionary function" which constitutes a license to violate the most funda-
mental law of all-the Constitution of the United States. 206
Norton's apparent adoption of absolute immunity for constitutional
violations was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Kelley v. Dunne. °T The Kelley court, however, like the majority in
Norton, failed to reach the basic question of whether unconstitutional
acts can ever be within the scope of a federal official's duties.205 The
court in Kelley rested its decision instead on the determination that the
public interest would be adequately served by granting the officer a
qualified privilege. This privilege would be lost if the plaintiff could
prove "actual malice," which includes "reckless indifference to the
rights of the individual citizen."2 °0
The respondents relied upon Barr v. Matteo210 to support their
claim of absolute immunity for unconstitutional actions. In Barr, two
employees of the federal Office of Rent Stabilization alleged that the
Acting Director of the agency had maliciously issued a defamatory
press release concerning them.21' A closely divided Court212 decided
that the issuance of the press release was "within the outer perimeter of
[the Acting Director's] line of duty,"2 ' and that the efficient adminis-
tration of government required absolute immunity from suit for state-
ments made within this outer perimeter.2 14  The suit, however, was a
206. 332 F.2d at 866.
207. 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965).
208. The failure of the court to squarely face the constitutional issue may have been
due to its unwillingness to disapprove the strong authority of Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). In Gregoire, federal
officials who had detained the plaintiff under an erroneous assumption that he was an
enemy alien were held to be immune from suit for false imprisonment. The com-
plaint in Gregoire involved further allegations of unconstitutional conduct (177 F.2d
at 579); however, the propriety of overriding constitutional rights for public policy
reasons does not appear to have been considered in Gregoire, either. Additionally, the
basic premise of Gregoire, which is that government will falter without the aid of offi-
cial immunity, seems completely unjustified. See text accompanying notes 238-39 infra.
209. 344 F.2d at 133.
210. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
211. Id. at 567-68.
212. The Court split five to four. Justice Harlan wrote the Court's opinion, which
Justices Clark, Frankfurter, and Whittaker joined. Justice Black concurred, based
upon his belief in the importance of unfettered speech. Justice Stewart dissented
because he felt the action of issuing the particular press release was not within the
scope of the Acting Director's duties. Chief Justice Warren dissented in an opinion
which Justice Douglas joined. Justice Brennan dissented in a separate opinion. The
Chief Justice, Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan thought that government officials
should only be entitled to a qualified privilege, rather than an absolute immunity.
213. 360 U.S. at 575.
214. Id. at 574-75.
[Vol. 5
NOTES
defamation action and did not involve any allegations of unconstitu-
tional conduct. It could even be argued that the constitutional rights
involved in Barr were those of the Acting Director-his rights under
the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and a free press.215
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistently indicated that gov-
ernment officials are not immune from suit for constitutional viola-
tions. In Malone v. Bowdoin216 a federal official was sued to recover
possession of land allegedly owned by the plaintiff, a private citizen.21
The Court determined the official was immune from suit only because
the alleged taking was not unconstitutional, the plaintiff being able to
recover just compensation in the Court of Claims:
218
[T]he action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a plain-
tiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer
as an individual only if the officer's action is "not within the officer's
statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void."219
Before the advent of the Court of Claims, suits against individual of-
ficials were allowed as the only practical means of enforcing the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against the governmental taking of land with-
out paying just compensation. Thus, in United States v. Lee22 0 an
award of specific relief for the recovery of possession of land was up-
held. Lee has been characterized as the "constitutional exception to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
' 22 1
In Pierson v. Ray222 the Court explicitly rejected the idea that state
police officers could be absolutely immune from suits based upon their
unconstitutional actions. 223  Justice Frankfurter had previously ex-
pressed the constitutional basis for this rejection in his dissenting opin-
ion in Monroe v. Pape
221
215. See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Barr, 360 U.S. at 577.
216. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
217. Id. at 643-44.
218. Id. at 647.
219. Id., quoting Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
702 (1949).
220. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
221. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1962); Larson v. Domestic and
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696 (1949).
222. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
223. Id. at 555.
224. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The majority held that the petitioners, who had been
subjected to unjustified searches and arrests, could maintain a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See note 168 supra. Justice Frankfurter dissented because he
felt that section 1983 only covered situations where the denial of the right was
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If, for example, petitioners had sought damages in the state courts of
Illinois and if those courts had refused redress on the ground that the
official character of the respondents clothed them with civil immunity,
we would be faced with the sort of situation to which the language in
[Wolf v. Colorado] was addressed: "[W]e have no hesitation in saying
that were a state affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into
privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 2
25
If state officers, aided by the guaranty of state sovereign immunity in
the Eleventh Amendment, cannot constitutionally be afforded immu-
nity for constitutional violations it seems clear that federal officials like-
wise cannot claim any such immunity. It has never been suggested that
the Bill of Rights places a heavier burden on the states than it does on
the federal government.
The second question is therefore the crucial one: should an official
receive protection (and if so, how much) for acts beyond the scope of
his authority? In Kelley v. Dunne2 26 protection was afforded in
the form of a qualified privilege, which would be lost if the plaintiff
could prove either actual malice or reckless indifference to the rights of
the individual citizen. 2 7  Although the criteria adopted for the quali-
fied privilege seem reasonable, the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourth
Amendment would appear to demand that the burden of proof be
shifted to the defendant officer. That is, instead of an immunity of any
kind, the officer should be allowed the defense of reasonable reliance
on statutes and prior court decisions. Conduct not meeting that stand-
ard would clearly amount to "reckless indifference." This is essen-
tially the standard approved by the Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray2 8
for actions under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.22' The Pierson Court held
that state officers sued for unlawful arrests are entitled to assert the de-
fense of good faith and probable cause, with good faith being equated
to action reasonably believed to be constitutional. 8 ° The test for
affirmatively sanctioned by the state. In the absence of state encouragement of the
illegal act, he felt that the injured party should pursue his remedy in the state courts.
225. 365 U.S. at 211 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 28 (1949); see note 224 supra.
226. 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965).
227. Id. at 133. See generally, H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, TIE FEDERAL COURTS
AND rm FEDERAL SYSTEM 1215-24 (1953).
228. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
229. See note 168 supra for the text of this statute.
230. 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). See Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir.
1968). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
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good faith is objective rather than subjective. 3' Under such a test, the
additional requirement of probable cause seems to be superfluous, since
it is elementary law that neither an arrest nor a search can be made
without probable cause.- - The result is that a state officer will be li-
able for an unconstitutional arrest or search unless he can demonstrate
that his actions were reasonable in the light of the then prevailing state
and federal law.233  The federal courts should not allow a broader de-
fense or privilege to be asserted by federal officers, even assuming the
courts could do so without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 34
The adoption of the good faith defense in lieu of any immunity would
serve the useful purpose of restoring to federal law the salutary princi-
ple of the personal accountability of government officials,23 5 while leav-
ing them a zone of protection when their actions are the result of rea-
sonable reliance on legal precedent. Indeed, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, as amicus curiae in Bivens, urged the adoption of such
a standard for actions within as well as without the scope of governmen-
tal duties:
A qualified privilege, involving good faith belief by the government
official that his action is consistent with his office and the United States
Constitution, is harmonious both with the principle of personal account-
ability and with the broadest justifiable freedom of action for govern-
ment officers. Conversely, the absolute privilege does not balance per-
sonal responsibility against government freedom, but simply relegates
the former to irrelevancy in the most important instances. As such,
the rule of Barr v. Matteo deviates seriously from settled principles of
231. See Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968); Kozlowski v. Ferrara,
117 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
232. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959).
233. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Of course, if the
law relied upon is obviously unconstitutional, no protection from suit will be afforded.
See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 232-34 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring), discussed in note 169 supra.
234. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Nichols, J., concur-
ring). See text accompanying notes 225 & 226 supra. The inviolability of constitu-
tional rights, as protected against arbitrary government action, was reiterated in Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957):
The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when ex-
pediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of
our Government. If . . . the Government can no longer satisfactorily operate
within the bounds laid down by the Constitution, that instrument can be amended
by the methods which it prescribes. But we have no authority, or inclination, to
read exceptions into it which are not there. Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
235. See note 260 infra.
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Furthermore, the departure from these settled principles in Barr was
based on an unjustified fear that the federal government would collapse
if its officials were not heavily immunized. However, the government
had not only survived, but had continuously grown in strength despite
the traditional tort rules of responsibility, which hold the government
official responsible unless he can establish the defense of good faith
and probable cause.2 7 The states have retained these same rules with-
out incurring any noticeable burden on the operation of their govern-
ments. 238  Finally, the flexibility and power of the federal summary
judgment mechanism should provide a relatively painless way to dis-
pose of actually frivolous suits.
230
Although the Court in Bivens did not rule on the immunity issue,
one can hazard a guess as to its attitude. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, described the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures as absolute.240  And it would be rather surpris-
ing should the Court allow the remedy it has afforded to be nullified by
an overly broad zone of protection of federal officials.
CONCLUSION
The Chief Justice noted in his dissent that "[t]his case has signifi-
236. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 13, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(citations omitted). Support for this proposal can be found in the Supreme Court's
refusal to grant absolute immunity to the press in the defamation area. Liability will
be imposed if printed statements concerning public figures or persons engaged in news-
worthy conduct are actually false and if actual malice, broadly defined as above to
include reckless indifference, exists. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). If the constitutional protections of speech
and the press do not confer an absolute immunity, how can mere "public policy"
do so, particularly a public policy devoid of any factual support? The anomalous
situation today finds government officials with a broader protection than that af-
forded to the press. The framers of the Constitution would be amazed.
237. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S.
605 (1912); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
238. W. PRossER, THm LAw op ToRTs § 132, at 989 (4th ed. 1971); see Katz,
supra note 15, at 44.
239. FED. R. Crv. P. 56; see Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 135 (1st Cir. 1965);
Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
240. See note 107 supra. And Justice Harlan, who authored the plurality opinion in
Barr, concluded his concurring opinion in Bivens with the thought that "at the very
least [the damage] remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently unjus-
tified sorts of police conduct." 403 U.S. at 411.
cance far beyond its facts and its holding. '2 41  He was referring pri-
marily to the mounting controversy over the exclusionary rule, 42 "under
which evidence of undoubted reliability and probative value has been
suppressed and excluded from criminal cases whenever it was obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.12 43  On the day that Bivens
was decided, several members of the Court sharply attacked the exclu-
sionary rule for the first time since the Court's decision in Mapp v.
Ohio.244 Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens ex-
pounded the view that the exclusionary rule is "an unworkable and ir-
rational concept of law."12 43  Justice Black, dissenting in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire,248 reiterated his belief that the exclusionary rule is bot-
tomed on the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourth,247 and that the
rule is necessarily limited in its scope by the language of the Constitu-
tion.248 Justice Blackmun joined Justice Black's dissent insofar as it
stated "that the Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary rule.
249
And Justice Harlan, concurring in Coolidge, observed that:
From the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is appar-
ent that the law of search and seizure is due for an overhauling ...
I would begin this process of reevaluation by overruling Mapp v. Ohio
and Ker v. California.
2 50
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens, was unwilling to "aban-
don the Suppression Doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be
developed. 251  The Chief Justice, analogizing to the inadequacies of
state tort actions against police officers,252 discounted the effectiveness
of the damage remedy afforded by the Bivens majority.2 53  He pro-
posed instead an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the
government itself 5 4-a step which could only be taken by Congress.
2 55
241. 403 U.S. at 412.
242. The Chief Justice cited a host of articles which are critical of the exclusionary
rule. 403 U.S. at 426-27.
243. Id. at 412.
244. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
245. 403 U.S. at 420.
246. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
247. Id. at 496-98.
248. Id. at 500.
249. Id. at 510.
250. Id. at 490.
251. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. at 420.
252. Id. at 421-22. See text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
253. 403 U.S. at 421.
254. Id. at 422.
255. Id.
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However, it would seem a little premature to be disregarding the rem-
edy afforded in Bivens. The majority clearly intended a remedy that
would be free of the nullifying limitations embedded in state tort law.2 16
It will be up to the federal courts to maximize the effectiveness of the
remedy by fashioning liberal recovery mechanisms, including, e.g., pun-
itive damages and damages for emotional harm and public embarrass-
ment.257 The officer should only be allowed the defense of objective
good faith.25 There is even precedent for a disallowance of sovereign
immunity when the violation of the constitutional right has been made
possible by the cloak of government authority.259 The injured party
could then join the government and the offending officer as defend-
ants, greatly increasing the likelihood of recovery. 260
Putting aside the ramifications the Bivens decision may have in the
area of criminal procedure, it is clear that the decision has greatly ex-
panded the legal role of the Constitution. The Court emphatically af-
firmed the power, and perhaps even the duty,251 of the federal courts
to treat the Constitution as a positive body of law that defines indi-
vidually vested rights enforceable through the medium of private civil
actions. If an individual right is secured in the Constitution, then a
civil suit for its deprivation should be maintainable in the federal
courts. 262  Bivens should thus serve as the basis for an "omnibus sec-
tion 1983" that will protect constitutional rights from encroachments
attempted under color of federal as well as state law. 203  Taken to-
gether, Bivens and Bell v. Hood have gone a long way toward de-
256. See text accompanying notes 71-84 supra. See also the discussion of Justice
Harlan's views on this point in text accompanying notes 170-76 supra.
257. See note 169 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 226-40 supra.
259. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 210-23 (1882); Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358, 367-72 (D.C. Cir. 1971); id. at 376 (Nichols, J., concurring). See text ac-
companying notes 220-21 supra. Furthermore, if sovereign immunity is considered to
have been judicially created, it can also be judicially abolished. Muskopf v. Coming
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218-19, 359 P.2d 457, 461, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1961).
260. It would not be advisable to shield the officer from all liability by substituting
the government as the exclusive defendant, since then the officer need no longer feel
accountable for his conduct. See W. PRossER, TiE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 992
(4th ed. 1971). But see Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" In-
munity for Police Officers in Damages Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965), wherein the
authors would apparently retain individual liability only for unconstitutional actions
which could not be characterized as within the scope of official duty. id. at 907-08,
910.
261. See note 138 supra.
262. See note 107 and text accompanying notes 105-07 supra.
263. See note 168 supra.
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veloping the long-ignored potential of the grant of general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.26'
Richard W. Wright
264. See note 104 supra
